After UN Showdown, INSTEX Can Help Sustain Iran Nuclear Deal

In return for limits to Iran’s nuclear activities under the 2015 agreement, or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the other side—the United States, the EU/E3 (France, Germany and the UK), China and Russia—were supposed to lift sanctions on the country. The US opted out of this compromise in May 2018 by withdrawing from the JCPOA. By deterring most private sector actors from Iran-related activities, US secondary sanctions have also prevented other JCPOA parties from living up to their end of the deal. In addition to a deep socio-economic crisis within Iran, US sanctions have undermined Iranian people’s access to basic humanitarian goods--and pushed the country to reduce its nuclear commitments. The EU and E3 efforts to protect the JCPOA under these circumstances have offered a grim lesson about the limits of European autonomy in a dollar-dominated world economy. 

When the Trump administration withdrew from the JCPOA, the EU stressed its commitment to ensuring continued sanctions lifting and to upholding the agreement. This determination was also expressed in practical measures. In summer 2018 the EU included the upcoming US sanctions on Iran in the so-called Blocking Regulation, thus banning EU companies from complying with them. In September 2018 the EU and the E3 announced that they would develop a special trade instrument to facilitate European-Iranian trade, including in oil, which was to be targeted by US secondary sanctions.

However, the Trump administration’s obliviousness to the Blocking Regulation soon exposed the absence of an effective enforcement mechanism to enforce it, and in practice US law took priority over EU law in the private sector’s risk assessments. Apparently recognizing their lack of political and economic leverage over US policy, by January 2019 the E3 had reduced the mission of the trade instrument—then named Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX)— to trade in humanitarian goods.

While its limited focus fell short of previous expectations that the EU could counter or even significantly minimize the negative effects of US sanctions, INSTEX addresses a critical problem created by them. Humanitarian trade, which is in principle exempt from sanctions, has also been hit by the banking sector’s fear of US penalties, leading to a medicine shortage in Iran. In addition to being urgent, addressing this particular area of sanction over-compliance is also practical, as humanitarian trade runs a lower risk of being targeted by US sanctions than other trade areas.

INSTEX seeks to enable the exchange of humanitarian goods or services between Europe and Iran without the transfer of currency, thus minimizing the risk of US penalties. European exporters are to be compensated with funds located in Europe, based on the value commensurate with the value of imports from Iran. INSTEX’ Iranian counterpart, the Special Trade and Finance Instrument (STFI), is similarly tasked to coordinate payments within Iran.

INSTEX can reassure banks and companies through its joint ownership by the E3 and four other European states—Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway, as well as Finland and Sweden, which are expected to join soon. In addition to providing a high level of trust in the instrument’s due diligence procedures, governmental ownership raises the threshold for the USA to impose sanctions on INSTEX.

Having processed only one pilot transaction thus far, INSTEX still needs to overcome major obstacles to function as intended. One key challenge is that the value of European exports to Iran exceeds the value of Iranian exports to Europe. Potential solutions to the problem include paying European exporters using Iran’s revenues currently frozen in foreign banks, or offering Iran a loan to buy humanitarian goods. However, the US is seeking to block these options.

The chances of striking a functioning trade balance could also be increased through the expansion of INSTEX to non-European companies, and extension of the INSTEX mandate to non-humanitarian trade that are not targeted by the USA but are impeded by fear of secondary sanctions. While INSTEX is unlikely to deliberately go against US sanctions, the E3 might decide to take further steps to protect is economic sovereignty if the instrument is targeted by the USA.

Currently it might seem that INSTEX is being taken over by political events, in particular the 2020 US presidential elections. Democratic Party victory in the elections could open the door for the US re-entry into the JCPOA, which would appear to make INSTEX less relevant. However, restoring the JCPOA or reaching any new agreements with Iran is dependent on sanctions lifting. This is likely to be difficult given the private sector’s disillusionment with the Obama administration’s previous assurances about the safety of engaging with Iran. INSTEX could help address this problem by providing additional guarantees to risk-averse banks and companies fearing the next U-turn in US policy towards Iran. 

Alternatively, the possibility of Trump’s re-election as US president—or a snapback of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran—could lead to the collapse of the JCPOA. While this can be expected to reduce European commitment to INSTEX, its humanitarian mission should be pursued as a matter of ethical necessity, even without the JCPOA.

Clearly, INSTEX alone cannot save the JCPOA, the future of which essentially depends on US-Iranian relations. INSTEX can nevertheless help maintain the nuclear agreement until, or even after, diplomatic solutions are found. In addition to demonstrating solidarity on the JCPOA and commitment to basic humanitarian principles, INSTEX can also been seen as a test case of a more independent European foreign policy.

Photo: IRNA

With Bolton Gone, Iran Must Seize Opportunity for De-Escalation

The news that Trump has fired John Bolton—though the former national security advisor insists he resigned—will be well received in Tehran. Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif had taken to branding Bolton as a member of the “B-Team”—alongside Israel’s Bibi Netanyahu, Saudi Arabia’s Mohammad bin Salman, and the UAE’s Mohammad bin Zayed—as a group that had been gunning for war in the Middle East. Iranian officials saw Bolton as a spoiler for diplomacy, a perception borne out by reporting on his role shaping and sharpening the Trump administration’s Iran policy over the last year. 

Bolton’s ouster represents a real opportunity for the Trump administration to walk back from maximum pressure as more pragmatic officials outside the NSC find the space to assert their views once more. Despite the active roles played by the State Department’s Iran envoy, Brian Hook, and the Treasury Department’s undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, Sigal Mandelker, in pushing forward the administration’s uncompromising messaging on Iran, the maximum pressure policy developed because Bolton was able to leverage his unique access to the president. Over the last year, Bolton repeatedly used this access to push the administration’s policy towards the extreme. 

In March, Bolton and Pompeo were at loggerheads as to whether the Trump administration should revoke waivers permitting eight countries to continue to purchase Iranian oil on the condition that revenues were paid into tightly controlled escrow accounts. Bolton eventually prevailed. The revocation of the oil waivers in May led to insecurity in the Persian Gulf as Iran threatened the passage of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz in retaliation for the restrictions on their oil exports. 

In April, the Trump administration designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), part of Iran’s armed forces, a “Foreign Terrorist Organization,” in a move that had been debated by administration officials since late 2017, when the U.S.  imposed a similar if less severe designation on the IRGC. Once again, Bolton was the key voice in favor of the move, despite the warnings of military and intelligence leaders that such a designation could make American troops in Iraq and Syria targets for retaliation. 

In July, Bolton’s NSC advocated the revocation of the waivers which permit civil nuclear cooperation projects critical for the implementation of the JPCOA. European officials feared that the revocation of the waivers would effectively kill the nuclear deal. Trump eventually sided with Treasury Sectretary Steve Mnuchin who argued in favor of renewal, allowing the JCPOA to limp along. 

Later that month, the Trump administration took the unprecedented step of sanctioning Zarif, despite reports earlier in the month that objections from Mnuchin and Pompeo had staved the move, strongly advocated by Bolton, to designate Iran’s foreign minister. The eventual designation caused an outcry in Iran, uniting figures across the political spectrum in condemnation of the U.S.. 

At each step Bolton doggedly pursued maximum pressure, pushing aside the concerns expressed the secretary of state, secretary of treasury, military leaders and intelligence officials alike. While Trump’s antagonism towards the Iran nuclear deal predates his appointment of Bolton, the transformation of the Trump administration’s Iran policy into one of “economic war” was nonetheless dependent on Bolton’s ideological fixations and mastery of the interagency process, qualities of which he has bragged. 

Earlier this summer, several U.S. officials relayed to me their concern that the Trump administration’s Iran policy increasingly consisted of steps that created political costs for the United States—straining relationships with allies in Europe while deepening rifts with adversaries like China—while adding little meaningful economic pressure on Iran. The departure of Bolton may come as a relief to many of the career officials in the State and Treasury Departments who felt a growing incoherence—and their own irrelevance—in the administration’s policy. 

It is certainly possible that President Trump will name another hawk to the role—there is no shortage of national security professionals in Washington wary of Iranian power—but it is highly unlikely that the replacement will have such a strong fixation on maximum pressure for its own sake. It is also unlikely that the new national security advisor will be as effective as John Bolton in working the bureaucratic machine of the White House. 

In the hours following Bolton’s departure, Mnuchin insisted that the administration will maintain its maximum pressure campaign on Iran. But the need for that insistence is itself reflective of the opportunity now presented for the administration to slowly rollback aspects of its maximum pressure campaign and for Iran to offer the Trump administration a credible path to de-escalation.  

With Bolton out, the prospects of direct talks between the US and Iran on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly later this month have certainly improved—Trump repeated his interest in meeting Iranian president Hassan Rouhani the same day he fired Bolton. But even if that remains a bridge too far for the Rouhani administration, who may consider it too risky to negotiate Trump in a moment of flux, there are more practical gains to be had. The simple restoration of the oil waivers, perhaps in accordance with the proposal advanced by French president Emmanuel Macron, could see Iran cease the resumption of uranium enrichment activities as part of its reduced compliance with the JCPOA.  

Iran’s political predicament and economic pains are not John Bolton’s fault. But Bolton consistently pushed U.S. policy in directions that were perceived by Iranians as “war by other means.” Over the last few months, Iran has responded in kind. Bolton’s departure therefore is a useful reminder that while conflict may have structural roots—it is only as inevitable as the selection of a warmonger as national security advisor.

Photo: Wikicommons

Economic War on Iran is America’s New ‘Forever War’

This article was originally published in the Asia Times.

The administration of US President Donald Trump last week designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, part of Iran’s armed forces, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. A White House statement boasted that it was “the first time that the United States has ever named a part of another government as an FTO” and declared that the “action will significantly expand the scope and scale of our maximum pressure on the Iranian regime.”

In a briefing related to the announcement of the new designation, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told reporters that he hopes “other governments and the private sector will now see more clearly how deeply the IRGC has enmeshed itself in the Iranian economy through both licit and illicit means”.

While there is no doubt that the Trump administration is waging a self-described “financial war” on Iran, designating the IRGC as a terrorist organization has little to do with adding new economic pressure, despite the administration’s claims. As sanctions attorney Tyler Cullis has argued, the IRGC and the wider Iranian economy are already subject to a “veritable labyrinth of US sanctions” meaning that “the designation of the IRGC as an FTO has limited, if any, immediate practical consequence.”

While the new designation does introduce increased criminal liabilities for those individuals or entities that can be shown to have provided “material support” to the IRGC, legitimate businesses were adequately deterred from engaging with the IRGC because of risks stemming from pre-existing sanctions designations.

Building a Sanctions Wall

The new designation may have limited economic impact, but it has certainly proved politically provocative. In Tehran, leaders from across political lines were unified in their condemnation of the designation and in their solidarity with the IRGC. In Washington, officials at the Pentagon and Central Intelligence Agency reportedly consider the move counterproductive, possibility putting US military and intelligence assets in the Middle East at risk of blowback. In Paris, French President Emmanuel Macron has called for all sides to practice restraint. He also spoke to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani by phone to reassure him of European support for the nuclear deal, which the US abandoned in May 2018.

In Baghdad, Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdel Mahdi told reporters that his government had tried to persuade the Trump administration not to proceed with the designation, noting that any escalation “would make us all losers.”

With the future of both the Iran nuclear deal and prospects for US-Iran diplomacy at stake, a political fallout is the clear intention behind designating the IRGC a terrorist organization. In an op-ed in The Wall Street Journal published just a week before the designation, the head of the hawkish Foundation for Defense of Democracies called for the Trump administration to create a “sanctions wall” that would hobble efforts by a potential Democratic president to re-enter the Iran nuclear deal in 2021. Mark Dubowitz has been among the most vocal proponents of designating the IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

To understand how the FTO designation helps build a “sanctions wall,” it is important to consider how such a designation fits into the recent development of US sanctions powers. Today’s financialized sanctions were largely developed in response to the “forever wars” of the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and the realization that the “war on terror” could not be won through conventional military conflict.

With public sentiment turning against further military deployments, and with the threat of terrorism expanding in part because of the fallout of the US invasions in the Middle East, the Treasury Department was tasked to develop new sanctions powers intended to weaken terrorist organizations by cutting their access to financial resources. As described by Juan Zarate, who served as deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism under president George W Bush, the US sought to develop its means of “financial war,” in which sanctions would “increasingly become the national-security tools of choice for the hard international security issues facing the United States.”

By the time Barack Obama took office as president, the use of sanctions in the “global war on terror” was overtaken by a new national-security imperative: addressing the perceived threat of Iranian nuclear proliferation. Suddenly, sanctions tools that had been developed primarily to target terrorist financing were being turned against governments, in part by leaning on the formal designation of countries like Iran as “state sponsors of terror.”

Building a Stigma

The application of sanctions seemed sensible – the US would leverage its primacy in the global financial system in order to block the assets of terrorist organizations and their state sponsors, while also putting their commercial enablers in legal jeopardy. Obama saw “diplomacy, backed with strong sanctions” as a direct alternative to reliance on military brinksmanship – ”a failed policy that has seen Iran strengthen its position.”

But there were unintended effects. While the US was tightening its sanctions on Iran, American officials toured the world warning companies that, despite their extensive due diligence, the opaque nature of the Iranian system meant an ever-present risk that routine commercial transactions could see funds diverted to designated groups that finance terrorism.

The stigma that arose around Iran’s economy and particularly its financial sector was so great that when Obama’s bet on diplomacy and sanctions finally paid off in the form of the historic JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) nuclear deal, he ultimately proved unable to deliver Iran the economic benefits of sanctions relief promised as part of the agreement, bringing it to the brink of collapse. Even though the US lifted a large proportion of its sanctions on Iran as a matter of legal fact, companies and the banks Tehran needed remained fearful to engage, rendering the practical impact negligible.

Opponents of Obama’s nuclear deal were quick to recognize this fact. When Trump came into office having promised to tear up a “decaying and rotten deal.” some even argued that his administration could advance its anti-Iran agenda while remaining in the JCPOA on the basis that Iran was receiving no meaningful benefits. Eventually Trump did withdraw from the agreement, but as hawks opposed to engagement with Iran look to the post-Trump future, whether that future arrives in 2021 or 2025, there is a clear desire to exploit the ways in which sanctions themselves have proven a liability to diplomacy.

In this way, given the lack of practical impact, the designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization has little to do with the activities of the corps as a military force, concerning though they may be.

Rather, by designating part of Iran’s state as a terrorist organization, a label that extends to millions of conscripts, those who wish to build a “sanctions wall” are seeking to close a political feedback loop. Not only does the FTO designation aim retroactively to justify the whole architecture of US sanctions on Iran, but even if the political circumstances between Washington and Tehran change in the future, sanctions will continue to be justified as a matter basic definitions. A future US administration seeking to lift sanctions on Iran will not merely need to argue the political expediency of that decision – it will now be forced in effect to “redefine” the most powerful force in Iranian national security, a tall order after 40 years of entrenched animosity.

What the FTO designation makes clear it that “financial war” on Iran is America’s new “forever war.”

Photo Credit: IRNA

Political Risks Outweigh Legal Impact of IRGC Terrorism Designation

This article was originally published by The Black List.

The Trump administration announced the designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)—a branch of Iran’s armed forces—as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).  In the White House press statement, President Trump called the designation “unprecedented,” underscoring that it represents “the first time that the United States has ever named a part of another government as a FTO.”   

Trump underlined that the designation “will significantly expand the scope and scale of our maximum pressure on the Iranian regime.” Secretary of State Mike Pompeo echoed those remarks in his own press conference announcing the designation, noting that the designation “will help starve the regime of the means to execute [the IRGC’s] destructive policy.” Helping amp up the designation action, US officials (dubiously) argued that the designation will target more than 11 million people comprising the IRGC’s network.

Hyperbole aside, the practical effect of the FTO designation is negligible at best. Considering the multiple sanctions programs under which the IRGC is currently designated, the FTO designation appears entirely superfluous, exerting no additional substantial pressure against the IRGC.  

On the other hand, the risks to the US from the designation could be severe. As long reported, the Department of Defense and the CIA have been steadfastly opposed to designating the IRGC an FTO—viewing the designation as fraught with consequences for US troops and without material benefit for the United States. Their opposition appears to have been overcome, however, by those in the White House and State Department who have rallied to increase the pressure-in substance or rhetoric-against Iran regardless of the potential consequences.

Legal Authority for FTO Designation and the Sanctions Consequences

12 U.S.C. § 1189 authorizes the Secretary of State to designate an organization an FTO if the Secretary finds that the organization is a foreign organization that engages in terrorist activity that threatens US nationals or US national security. The Secretary’s intent to designate a foreign organization an FTO is first communicated to members of the Congress, along with the findings and factual basis for the Secretary’s decision to designate the organization, which explains the apparent delay between President Trump’s announcement and the formal designation of the IRGC as an FTO.  

The immediate consequences of an FTO designation are limited in scope.  Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1189(2)(C), the Secretary of Treasury is given discretionary authority to require US financial institutions to block all financial transactions involving assets of an FTO. In addition, all members of an FTO are prohibited from entering the United States under 12 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3). This latter provision could be used to block Iranian persons who performed mandatory military service in Iran from entering the United States. This could explain the “11 million people” claim by members of the Trump administration.

Preexisting US Sanctions Targeting IRGC

The IRGC is already designated under multiple U.S. sanctions authorities—most of which cover the ground of an FTO designation. For instance, the IRGC is designated under:

• E.O. 13224 as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist;

• E.O. 13382 as a WMD Proliferator;

• E.O. 13553 as a human rights abuser; and

• E.O. 13606 as a human rights abuser as well.

These designations have significant U.S. secondary sanctions consequences. For instance, 31 C.F.R. § 561.201 exposes foreign financial institutions that conduct a significant financial transaction with, or provide significant financial services for or on behalf of the IRGC or a person designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 or E.O. 13382, to correspondent or payable-through account sanctions. In addition, the Iran Freedom Counter-Proliferation Act subjects foreign banks to correspondent or payable-through account sanctions, and foreign persons to menu-based sanctions, for engaging in significant transactions with Iranian persons, which would include the IRGC.

Due to the serious secondary sanctions consequences inherent in dealing with the IRGC, OFAC has long given the IRGC its own program tag “[IRGC]” to aid foreign persons seeking to comply with U.S. sanctions targeting the group.  

In addition, multiple US statutory authorities require the President to identify officials, agents, or affiliates of the IRGC and to impose sanctions with respect to them. These reporting requirements ensure that the U.S. remains hyper-focused on the IRGC and its activities and prepared to impose additional designations as warranted.

Practical Consequences of FTO Designation

Amidst this veritable labyrinth of US sanctions targeting the IRGC, the designation of the IRGC as an FTO has limited, if any, immediate practical consequence.  For instance, the blocking of the IRGC’s assets is already mandated by the executive authorities under which the IRGC is designated—some of which also impose visa requirements.  Iranian persons who formerly served in the IRGC have long been subject to intensified scrutiny from US immigration authorities and have often been denied entry on these grounds.

The sole possible additional consequence arising from an FTO designation is the extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction afforded over foreign persons acting outside the United States that knowingly provide material support to an FTO.  18 U.S.C. § 2339B states that persons who knowingly provide material support or resources to an FTO or attempt or conspire to do so are subject to fine or imprisonment of not more than twenty (20) years (unless death results from the prohibited act). Material support is defined broadly to include any property or service.

18 U.S.C. § 2339B(d)(1) expressly provides for extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, stating that there is jurisdiction over an offense “if . . . after the conduct required for the offense occurs an offender is brought into or found within the United States, even if the conduct required for the offense occurs outside the United States.” This means that foreign persons providing material support to an FTO are subject to criminal prosecution in the United States, even if the foreign person has no legal status in the United States; acted outside of the United States; and the conduct did not touch or otherwise have effects within the United States.

This provision could lead foreign parties conducting business with Iran to exercise even more heightened due diligence with regard to their dealings. Yet, the consequences of dealing with the IRGC are already especially dire, and foreign parties doing legitimate trade with Iran are likely to have taken steps to ensure the absence of IRGC-related parties.       

So What’s the Purpose...?

Considering the negligible benefits of an FTO designation, the Trump administration appears to have two things in mind through its designation of the IRGC: (1) to invite an Iranian response that could collapse the nuclear deal and risk a broader conflict with the United States; and (2) to use the threat of criminal prosecution to deter even legitimate business with Iran, as members of the Trump administration have long claimed that the IRGC controls broad sectors of the Iranian economy. This latter element could also be used to constrain a future President from re-entering the Iran nuclear accord and complying with its terms, considering the potential political pitfalls inherent in rescinding the FTO designation.

Indeed, chief proponent of the FTO designation and close adviser to the Trump administration Mark Dubowitz of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies stated that the designation “just layers on top of all of the current sanctions an additional and more expansive, punitive measure that will deter more business and . . . diminish current business that’s still ongoing between the Europeans and the Iranians, and the Asians and the Iranians.” The purpose of this, he earlier wrote, is to “make the case for dismantling these sanctions [hard],” thereby “block[ing] [the next administration] from delivering sanctions relief to Iran” consistent with the Iran nuclear accord.

Such motivations—if accurately depicting internal deliberations by the administration—would prove a grave abuse of the FTO designation process and the broader use of US sanctions authorities to target activities anathema to US security interests.   

Photo Credit: IRNA

Lack of Helicopters Shows Sanctions Impact on Iran Flood Response

In a brief statement issued on Tuesday, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo offered condolences to “the victims of the recent floods in Iran” while claiming, “it is the [Iranian regime’s] mismanagement that has led to this disaster.” Pompeo asserted that the Trump administration “stands ready to assist and contribute to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, which would then direct the money through the Iranian Red Crescent for relief.”

Pompeo’s statement appears to have been spurred by reports that the Iranian Red Crescent Society (ICRS) is unable to accept international aid due to a lack of viable banking channels.  Ali Asghar Peyvandi, the head of the Iranian Red Crescent Society, told reporters in Iran that “Prior to the [reimposition of US] sanctions, we had some Red Crescent accounts connected to SWIFT, and we sought international aid through them. However, at present, these accounts have been sanctioned and there is no possibility for money transfers from other countries.”

These statements have led to questions as the role sanctions may have played in Iran’s unconvincing response to unprecedented floods, which have killed over 50 people and caused widespread devastation. But in the context of rescue and relief operations, the ability to raise funds after a disaster matters far less than the level of preparedness before the disaster, especially in a country like Iran with its substantial financial resources. So even if sanctions are impeding the delivery of financial aid, a more important question is whether or not sanctions had a meaningful impact on preparedness. A look at Iran’s failure to procure rescue helicopters helps answer that question.

On Tuesday, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif pointed to sanctions-related impediments in a tweet, stating, “Blocked equipment includes relief choppers.” Placing blame on the US, Zarif declared, "This isn't just economic warfare; it's economic TERRORISM.” Zarif’s anger likely stems from the fact that Iran had attempted to purchase much-needed search-and-rescue helicopters over the last few years, but was thwarted by both the failed implementation of sanctions relief under the JCPOA as well as the reimposition of sanctions by the Trump administration.

The Iranian Red Crescent Society (IRCS) operates an air rescue fleet that it has long needed to modernize. In 2015, with the prospect of sanctions relief on the horizon, IRCS approached foreign suppliers with the intention to purchase 28 new helicopters to augment its fleet of Russian-made Mil Mi-171 cargo helicopters and Iranian-made Bell-412 utility helicopters. Airbus Helicopters came forward as an early suitor and collaborated with ICRS on corporate social responsibility projects to help build trust. In 2016, the Airbus Foundation and ICRS launched a program to “to train thousands of Iranian teenagers aged between 12 and 14 in robotics and resilience techniques, developing their skills to respond to disasters and ensuring safer and more resilient communities for the future.” Even American defense contractor Lockheed Martin, parent company of helicopter-maker Sikorsky, publicly stated that it was studying the feasibility of selling civilian helicopters to Iran.

In 2017, drawing on new funding made available by parliament, the Iran’s Ministry of Health sought to purchase 45 BK-117 air ambulances from Airbus Helicopters configured for rapid response to accidents and medical emergencies in urban areas. A report on the delivery of the first two aircraft notes that Iran had just 21 air ambulances in operation at the time. Just a couple months later, in November 2017, a massive earthquake hit Kermanshah, killing 600 and once again demonstrating the urgency for Iran to upgrade its search-and-rescue capacity.

But the continued presence of US primary sanctions made it difficult for Iran to secure financing for the ICRS and Ministry of Health helicopter acquisitions, slowing the delivery of the aircraft. Helicopters can also be considered “dual-use,” given possible military applications of key parts, and so the deals were subject to significant scrutiny by US and European regulators.  Just 8 helicopters had been delivered to the Ministry of Health by Airbus by the time that the Trump administration withdrew from the JCPOA nuclear deal and reimposed secondary sanctions on Iran. ICRS did not take delivery of any new helicopters. 

Today, ICRS has responded to the unprecedented flooding in Iran with just “23 rescue and relief helicopters,” which are spread thinly across multiple provinces as they deliver supplies and transport the injured to medical facilities. ICRS’s old fleet lacks night vision technology, meaning that only Iran’s military can run rescue operations at night.

Importantly, Iran’s disaster relief agencies were aware of such shortcomings and have tried to address them. Between 2005-2015, the United Nations spearheaded a “global blueprint for disaster risk reduction efforts” called the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). Iran was among the 168 participating countries, which undertook a systematic evaluation of their disaster readiness.

Iran’s final assessment report, published in 2013, evaluates Iran’s level of disaster preparedness in regards to whether “financial reserves and contingency mechanisms are in place to support effective response and recovery when required.” The report notes encouragingly that Iran has set aside “national contingency and calamity funds.” But key constraints include “international sanctions and restrictions and lack of cooperation in providing humanitarian equipment” as well as “insufficient equipment when a large-scale disaster happens.” Put more simply, the report concludes that while sanctions have a limited impact on the availability of financial resources for disaster response, they have a serious detrimental impact on the ability to procure adequate rescue equipment. The effort to acquire new helicopters in the brief period in which Iran was provided sanctions relief reflects an attempt to address such shortcomings.

Discussing the impact of sanctions on the rescue operations after the recent floods does not deflect from the Iranian government’s ultimate responsibility for the ineffective response to the disaster. Nor does it excuse the negligence that created longstanding vulnerabilities, such as failing to ensure “risk sensitive regulation in land zoning and private real estate development,” shortcoming identified in Iran’s HFA report. But sanctions will remain even when the floods subside. It is imperative for American policymakers to account for the ways that “maximum pressure” policies directed towards Iran will continue to complicate Iran’s efforts to prepare for the next natural disaster. Facilitating donations will mean little if Iran is unable to procure the equipment that will make its disaster response more effective in the next instance.

Photo Credit: IRNA