Iraq Begins to Adjust to Syria’s Post-Assad Reality
On Friday, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani met with Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa in Qatar—their first encounter. The meeting placed regional security at its core. Talks focused on border control and counterterrorism and shared concerns over instability along the Iraqi-Syrian frontier.
The collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria in early December 2024 ushered in a new geopolitical reality for the Middle East. Syria’s neighbours, such as Iraq, have been prompted to reassess their approach to Damascus. While Baghdad had no deep affinity Assad, the Assad regime at least provided a degree of predictability while also maintaining close ties with Iraq's strategic partner, Iran.
In this new era, the rise of Syria's interim President, Ahmad al-Sharaa—a former al-Qaeda militant in Iraq—has sparked some alarm among Iraq’s security establishment. Iraq's stance on Syria is shaped by its own civil war experience, when cross-border militancy exacerbated sectarian tensions and fueled years of conflict.
Today, Iraqi officials fear that renewed instability in Syria could provide fertile ground for an Islamic State (IS) resurgence, jeopardising Iraq's already fragile security situation. Securing Iraq’s 600-kilometer border with Syria remains the top priority in the midst of ongoing challenges such as cross-border smuggling, extremist infiltration, and refugee flows. At the same time, Baghdad must assess if Syria’s new leadership can be reliable partners and whether deeper political and economic cooperation can be pursued.
In the immediate aftermath of Assad’s departure, Iraq’s leadership adopted an approach of measured pragmatism. Rather than rushing into full diplomatic engagement like several other Arab states, policymakers in Iraq opted for a security-first strategy. This entailed dispatching intelligence officials to Damascus and extending a cautious invitation to Syria’s new foreign minister for talks in Baghdad. Prime Minister al-Sudani reaffirmed Iraq’s commitment to Syria’s sovereignty while swiftly moving to reinforce border security.
The hesitation among Iraq’s leadership reflects both uncertainty over the stability of Syria’s new government as well as internal political debates over normalising diplomatic relations. Al-Sharaa’s past ties to jihadist networks in Iraq has prompted unease. His record is especially sensitive in Baghdad, given the Al Qaeda’s role in orchestrating sectarian atrocities during the 2006-2007 civil conflict.
Having endured a grueling counterinsurgency campaign against IS from 2014 to 2017, and still facing monthly attacks by IS sleeper cells, Iraq remains deeply wary of any potential spillover that could revive insurgent networks within its borders. The continued porousness of the Iraq-Syria border remains a primary vector for IS mobilisation, heightening Baghdad’s concerns.
In the lead-up to the meeting between Sudani and al-Sharaa, Iraq’s initial steps towards engagement with Syria focused on security coordination. In late December 2024, Baghdad repatriated 1,905 Assad-era soldiers who had fled across the border. Around the same time, Iraq’s National Intelligence Director, Hamid al-Shatri, was dispatched to Damascus for talks with Syria’s transitional government, focusing on counterterrorism and intelligence-sharing.
A central issue on the agenda was the al-Hol detention camp, which holds over 40,000 IS-associated detainees—many of them Iraqi nationals—amid deteriorating security conditions. The continued instability in northeastern Syria, where IS remnants remain active, coupled with the uncertain future of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), pose an immediate risk that Baghdad cannot afford to ignore.
The 10 March 2025 agreement between Damascus and the SDF, which outlines a framework for the eventual integration of Kurdish forces into Syria’s national security apparatus, represents another critical variable in Iraq’s evolving defence calculus. Baghdad is closely monitoring how the deal unfolds, particularly its implications for Kurdish armed groups operating along the Iraq-Syria border. While security officials in Iraq see the agreement as a potential step toward stabilising the area, they remain wary that unresolved tensions between the SDF and Turkish-backed factions could trigger further conflict, with possible spillovers into Iraqi territory.
Damascus has responded with public commitments to closer coordination and has agreed to expand joint counterterrorism efforts. This message was reinforced during Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani’s first official visit to Iraq in mid-March 2025. During the visit, Shaibani called for the restoration of formal border operations and described enhanced bilateral trade as a priority.
He also underlined Syria’s readiness to cooperate with Iraq against remnants of IS, framing national safety as a “shared responsibility.” Baghdad, for its part, expressed respect for the Syrian people’s political choices while urging Damascus to ensure the safety of Syrians residing in Iraq. This was motivated by rising tensions following acts of violence targeting Syria’s Alawite minority. Syria’s new leadership has also signalled interest in rejoining regional forums and hinted at deeper future engagement. Nonetheless, it is likely to prioritise security coordination and economic lifelines as initial steps in its post-Assad foreign policy.
Discussions reportedly included the potential reopening of formal border crossings to bolster trade and economic ties, though no official confirmation has been issued. Prime Minister Sudani also extended an invitation to al-Sharaa to attend the upcoming Arab League Summit in Baghdad on 17 May 2025, which would mark Syria’s first participation since Assad’s fall. The encounter underscores both countries’ interest in renewing coordination while also highlighting Qatar’s expanding role as a facilitator of regional dialogue.
Though no formal security pact exists between the two states, the Iraq government has taken proactive steps to fortify its defences. Additional units from the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) have been deployed to reinforce Iraqi Armed Forces positions along the border, aiming to prevent militant infiltration. Iraq has also stepped up its border control operations, targeting smuggling networks and intensifying surveillance of cross-border movements—measures deemed crucial for curbing terrorist activities and illegal trade.
A further issue shaping Iraq’s relationship with Syria is the illicit narcotics trade, particularly the trafficking of Captagon pills, which has long been a highly lucrative industry linked to Syria. Iraqi authorities have escalated anti-smuggling efforts, resulting in several major drug seizures in recent months. These efforts reflect not only Baghdad’s commitment to combating organised crime but also its broader apprehension over how Syria’s new government will handle such networks.
While Iraq’s security forces have intensified enforcement measures, it remains unclear whether Syria’s transitional leadership will actively cooperate in dismantling the entrenched drug trade that flourished under the previous regime. For decision-makers in Iraq, tackling the Captagon crisis is not merely a matter of law enforcement; it serves as a litmus test for the credibility of Syria’s new leadership in managing governance and perimeter control.
Beyond defence issues, Iraq is also entangled in Syria’s unfolding humanitarian crisis. With over 270,000 Syrian refugees residing in Iraq, the government has initiated discussions with Damascus on the possibility of voluntary repatriation. Yet, given Syria’s fragile political transition, the feasibility of such efforts remains highly uncertain.
Iraq has also expanded its humanitarian aid to Deir ez-Zor and other northeastern Syrian regions, recognising that stabilising these areas is not only a moral imperative but also a strategic necessity to prevent them from becoming breeding grounds for renewed insurgency. Still, the extent of Baghdad's direct involvement in Syria's reconstruction remains ambiguous as the Iraqi government carefully weighs the financial and political risks of committing to more substantial interaction with its fragile neighbour.
While security and political apprehension dominate the immediate landscape, Iraq’s long-term interests in Syria extend to broader economic and infrastructural considerations. The reopening of trade corridors, enhancement of cross-border infrastructure, and development of joint energy projects remain possibilities, but these initiatives all hinge on the stabilisation of Syria’s internal situation. The Iraqi government is closely monitoring whether Damascus can establish a functional administrative and legal framework capable of supporting such cooperation.
Despite deep historical and economic ties between the two countries, reviving meaningful economic connectivity remains a long-term goal rather than an immediate priority. Some Iraqi officials have floated the idea of restoring the long-defunct Kirkuk-Baniyas oil pipeline, which could provide the country with a valuable Mediterranean export route. However, the project remains highly speculative due to political uncertainties and infrastructural constraints. The mutability of post-Assad Syria, combined with an unclear regulatory environment, makes any large-scale economic venture premature at best.
Similarly, Iraq has historically been a key trading partner for Syria, particularly in sectors such as agriculture, pharmaceuticals, and textiles. Yet current trade volumes remain limited, constrained by logistical hurdles, sanctions-related restrictions, and widespread uncertainty regarding Syria’s economic trajectory under its new leadership. Until greater political and security clarity emerges, Baghdad is unlikely to pursue major cross-border infrastructure projects or economic initiatives with Damascus.
Dialogue between Iraq and Syria does not occur in a vacuum. It is heavily influenced by broader regional dynamics, particularly the actions of Iran, Turkey, and the United States. Tehran, which has long been reliant on both Iraq and Syria as strategic buffers and conduits to the Mediterranean, is recalibrating its approach following Assad’s fall. Iran-aligned factions within Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), some of which fought alongside Assad’s forces, are navigating a complex transition. While some have cautiously opened channels with Syria's new leadership, others remain sceptical, wary of the new rulers’ Sunni Islamist orientation.
Turkey’s growing presence in northern Syria adds further complexity to Iraq’s calculations. Ankara’s confrontations with the SDF, its broader regional ambitions, and its evolving posture in Kurdish affairs should all factor into the Iraqi government’s strategic planning.
Recent peace overtures between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) have also raised questions about Kurdish dynamics across the Iraq-Syria border. Iraqi-Kurdish factions are monitoring these developments closely, as any shifts in Turkey’s Syria policy could directly impact their own force readiness and political leverage.
Meanwhile, the uncertain future of US policy in Syria also weighs heavily on decision-makers in Iraq. While American forces continue counterterrorism operations in northeastern Syria, primarily in coordination with the SDF, the long-term sustainability of this presence remains in doubt. A potential US drawdown—currently projected for September 2025—could have significant repercussions for Iraq. Should Washington scale back its commitment, a resulting security vacuum could embolden IS remnants, compelling Iraq to step up its border control efforts to prevent the instability from spilling over.
For now, Iraqi officials are expected to continue pursuing a phased, security-first approach when it comes to relations with Syria. As regional actors, including Turkey, Iran, and the United States, readjust their positions on Syria, Iraq must carefully navigate its own path, ensuring that its national security remains the cornerstone of its Syria policy.
The trajectory of Iraq-Syria relations in the coming months will hinge on whether Syria’s new leadership can establish stability, contain security threats, and lay the groundwork for meaningful regional cooperation. Until then, Iraq’s engagement is expected to remain cautious, pragmatic, and primarily focused on safeguarding its own frontiers.
Photo: Getty Images
